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Abstract
Many environmental philosophers have argued that there is an obligation for individuals to reduce their 
individual carbon footprints. However, few of them have addressed whether this obligation would entail 
a corresponding duty to limit one’s family size. In this paper, I examine several reasons that one might 
view procreative acts as an exception to a more general duty to reduce one’s individual greenhouse gas 
emissions. I conclude that none of these reasons are convincing. Thus, if there is an obligation to reduce 
one’s unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions, then people should also limit the size of their families when 
they have the means to do so.
Trevor Hedberg
University of South Florida
Essays Philos (2019)20:1  |  DOI:  10.7710/1526-0569.1629
Correspondence: tgh1@usf.edu
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 20, Issue 1Essays in Philosophy
2 | eP1628 Essays in Philosophy
Global climate change, if it continues its current rate of progression, will have tremen-
dous effects on present people, future people, and the nonhuman community. Some of 
these effects include more severe weather events (e.g., heat waves, droughts, hurricanes), 
sea-level rise, regional food and fresh-water shortages, increased vulnerability to disease, 
ocean acidification, and biodiversity loss.1 In simple terms, climate change will cause a 
lot of people—both present and future—to suffer or die, and will cause many nonhuman 
species to go extinct. Given the moral gravity of these impacts, it is clear that something 
must be done to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the near future, and the global 
scale of the problem entails that international political action will be required to accom-
plish that task.
Nevertheless, climate change also presents challenging moral questions for individuals. 
Many individual emissions are not required for personal survival, and these emissions 
add to the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. Since such emissions contribute 
to a severe and ongoing environmental harm, they appear morally unjustifiable. Some 
philosophers reach this conclusion on consequentialist grounds by arguing that an in-
dividual’s emissions, despite constituting only a tiny percentage of global emissions, are 
still great enough to cause significant harms.2 An alternative consequentialist argument 
is that individual emissions increase the likelihood of crossing a negative climate thresh-
old that leads to severe weather events (or other impacts) that otherwise could have been 
avoided.3 If that reasoning is correct, then we should reduce our GHG emissions even if 
the probability of an individual emission making a difference is low because the impacts 
1  The most comprehensive list of impacts and their effects comes from the reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). For their most recent report, see IPCC, Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). The World Health Organization (WHO) has also conducted a series of studies 
to measure the annual casualties caused by the impacts of climate change on human health. See WHO, 
“Climate and Health: Fact Sheet, July 2005,” WHO, July 2005, http://www.who.int/globalchange/news/
fsclimandhealth/en/index.html; Global Health Risks: Mortality and Burden of Disease Attributable to 
Selected Major Risks (Geneva: WHO Press, 2009), http://www.who.int/healthinfo/ 
global_burden_disease/GlobalHealthRisks_report_full.pdf; and Quantitative Risk Assessment of the 
Effects of Climate Change on Selected Causes of Death, 2030s and 2050s (Geneva: WHO Press, 2014), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/134014/1/9789241507691_eng.pdf. 
2  See John Nolt, “How Harmful Are the Average American’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions?” Ethics, 
Policy, and Environment 14, no. 1 (2011): 3–10; John Nolt, “The Individual’s Obligations to Relinquish 
Unnecessary Greenhouse-Gas-Emitting Devices,” Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series) 3, no. 1 
(2013): 139‒65; and John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (New York: Norton, 
2012), chapter 5.
3  See Ben Almassi, “Climate Change and the Ethics of Individual Emissions: A Response to Sinnott-
Armstrong,” Perspectives 4, no. 1 (2012): 4–21.
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of those actions—when they do make a difference—will be enormous. 
Non-consequentialists have also defended a duty to reduce individual GHG emissions. 
Christian Baatz argues that individuals should not exceed their fair share of emission 
rights and are obligated to reduce their emissions (insofar as they can) if they are above 
that threshold.4 Travis Rieder contends that the duty to reduce individual emissions 
stems from a more general duty not to contribute to massive, systematic harms.5 Other 
philosophers have appealed to virtue ethics and argued that reducing individual emis-
sions is required to maintain one’s moral integrity.6
This quick survey is not meant to be exhaustive or to establish the consensus among 
environmental philosophers. Not everyone is convinced that there is a strict obligation 
for individuals to reduce their GHG emissions.7 But it is clearly true that many environ-
mental philosophers believe such a duty exists and that many arguments can be offered 
to support this conclusion. Rather than retread familiar territory, I want to consider a 
relatively unexplored question in this literature: assuming that there is a general duty to 
reduce one’s individual carbon footprint, what implications does this duty have for the 
ethics of procreation?
4 See Christian Baatz, “Climate Change and Individual Duties to Reduce GHG Emissions,” Ethics, Policy, 
and Environment 17, no. 1 (2014): 1–19; and “Reply to My Critics: Justifying the Fair Share Argument,” 
Ethics, Policy, and Environment 19, no. 2 (2016): 160–69
5 See Travis Rieder, Toward a Small Family Ethic: How Overpopulation and Climate Change Are 
Affecting the Morality of Procreation (Cham, CH: Springer, 2016), 26–29
6  See Marion Hourdequin, “Climate Change, Collective Action, and Individual Obligations, 
Environmental Values 19, no. 4 (2010): 443–63; and Trevor Hedberg, “Climate Change, Moral Integrity, 
and Obligations to Reduce Individual Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Ethics, Policy, and Environment 21, 
no. 1 (2018): 64–80.
7  Some skeptics about a duty to reduce one’s individual carbon footprint include Baylor Johnson 
(“Ethical Obligations in a Tragedy of the Commons,” Environmental Values 12, no. 3 [2003]: 271–87); 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (“It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations,” 
in Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Politics, Ethics, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and 
Richard B. Howarth [Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005], 285–307); Joakim Sandberg (“My Emissions Make 
No Difference,” Environmental Ethics 33 no. 3 [2011]: 229–48); and Dan Shahar (“Treading Lightly 
on the Climate in a Problem-Ridden World,” Ethics, Policy, and Environment 19, no. 2 [2016]: 
183–95). Notably, Johnson retracted this claim in later work; see Johnson, “The Possibility of a Joint 
Communique: My Response to Hourdequin,” Environmental Values 20, no. 2 [2011]: 147–56). For 
replies to some of the common grounds for this skepticism, about duties to reduce individual GHG 
emissions, see Anne Schwenkenbecher, “Is There an Obligation to Reduce One’s Individual Carbon 
Footprint?” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2014): 168–88. 
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When we think of reducing our individual GHG emissions, the actions that typically 
come to mind involve driving less, taking fewer cross-country flights, conserving elec-
tricity, and perhaps eating less meat, but it is rare for the duty to reduce individual emis-
sions to be explicitly connected to the ethics of procreation.8 As we will see, however, 
determining one’s family size is likely the most significant decision that one will make 
with respect to their individual carbon footprint. As a result, if there is a duty to reduce 
one’s unnecessary GHG emissions, then prima facie there is a moral obligation to limit 
one’s family size when it is possible to do so, particularly for those who live in the de-
veloped world and have large individual carbon footprints.9 If limiting one’s procreation 
is not required by this more general obligation, then we need an explanation for why it 
is such a special exception. However, I argue that the most common reasons offered to 
undercut this obligation—again, assuming that there is a general duty to reduce one’s 
individual GHG emissions—are unsuccessful. As it stands, we are left to conclude that 
there is indeed a duty to limit one’s family size when possible, at least until further, more 
persuasive arguments to the contrary are presented.
I begin with an overview of the carbon footprint tied to procreation and how it compares 
with other human activities. I then examine several common reasons that one might of-
fer for thinking that procreation—despite its enormous carbon footprint—could still be 
an exception to the general duty to reduce GHG emissions. Ultimately, I argue that none 
of these reasons is compelling, so for now, we should conclude that procreation is not a 
special action that is exempt from the duty to reduce GHG emissions. If there is a general 
obligation to reduce unnecessary GHG emissions, then those to whom it applies should 
also limit our family size. In the concluding section, I also consider what fulfilling this 
obligation would mean in practice.
The Carbon Footprint of Procreating
The case that a duty to reduce one’s GHG emissions entails a duty to limit one’s procre-
ation is rather straightforward. As a starting point, consider what courses of action are 
8  Notable exceptions include Christine Overall, Why Have Children? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2012); Sarah Conly, One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), and Rieder, Toward a Small Family Ethic.
9  The duty to reduce one’s individual carbon footprint is usually targeted at those in developed nations 
because those in developing nations often have emissions that are perilously low—these people 
cannot reduce their emissions without thereby lacking the means to provide for their basic needs. For 
the purposes of this paper, I am not going to deviate from the convention and will assume that the 
implications of my argument are reserved primarily for those living in developed nations where citizens 
have carbon-intensive lifestyles.
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typically recommended as a result of a duty to reduce one’s carbon footprint. Commonly 
mentioned duties usually include driving and flying less, buying more fuel-efficient ve-
hicles, eating less meat, converting to more energy-efficient light bulbs, and setting the 
thermostat to lower temperatures in the winter and higher temperatures in the summer. 
Most would, I imagine, regard these activities as environmentally good things to do. 
What’s remarkable, however, is that the emissions reductions tied to these behavioral 
changes pale drastically in comparison to the reductions that could be made by having 
fewer children.
Paul Murtaugh and Michael Schlax conducted an elaborate study to measure the GHGs 
tied to an act of procreation. They attempted to measure a person’s carbon legacy—the 
carbon footprint tied to their genes. In making their calculations, they regarded a par-
ent as being responsible for one half of their children’s GHG emissions, one fourth of 
their grandchildren’s emissions, and so on. Combining this formula with data regarding 
fertility rates, life expectancy, and the average individual emissions of citizens in various 
nations, they compiled data regarding the carbon footprint tied to acts of procreation.10
Murtaugh and Schlax’s results reveal that procreation massively increases a individual’s 
carbon footprint. Having an additional child in China increases a person’s carbon foot-
print by 1384 metric tons, and a new child in Russia boosts each parent’s carbon foot-
print by 2498 metric tons. The figures for the United States are particularly staggering. 
They estimate that the lifetime emissions tied to the carbon legacy of one child born in 
the United States is roughly 9,441 metric tons of CO2, assuming that the emissions rates 
of one’s descendants are roughly equivalent to the average emissions of a 2005 US citizen. 
Although the figures are lower for other countries, a general fact remains true across all 
countries: having one fewer child reduces one’s carbon footprint far more than any other 
available actions.11
In the United States, for instance, driving a vehicle that gets 30 mpg rather than 20 mpg 
for your entire life will save you 148 metric tons of CO2. That’s no small sum, but it’s 
less than 1.6% of the 9,441 metric tons of CO2 that you would save by having one fewer 
10  Paul Murtaugh and Michael Schlax, “Reproduction and the Carbon Legacies of Individuals,” Global 
Environmental Change 19, no. 1 (2009): 18.
11  Murtaugh and Schlax assume that emissions will remain constant at 2005 levels. Obviously, it is 
possible that per capita emissions decline in the future, so this projection might prove too extreme in 
the long run. Nevertheless, the more general observation that procreative choices radically outweigh 
other lifestyle choices in terms of carbon footprint will remain true for the foreseeable future, especially 
since emissions worldwide have increased since 2005, which means the figures in their constant emission 
scenario would be higher if they were calculated today.
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child. If you live in the developed world, the degree to which procreating less affects your 
lifetime carbon footprint should not be understated. In a further application of the data 
gathered by Murtaugh Schlax, Seth Wynes and Kimberly Nicholas concluded that for 
a person living in the developed world, not having an additional child would (on aver-
age) save 58.6 tonnes of CO2 equivalent annually. The next highest impact action in their 
survey was living car free—which would save an average of 2.4 tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
annually. In other words, on their assessment, choosing to have one fewer child is twenty-
four times more effective at reducing one’s carbon footprint than living without a car! In 
fact, having one fewer child makes a six times larger difference than the sum of all eleven 
of the other individual actions they examined.12
If there is any duty to reduce individual GHG emissions, it would seem that the strongest 
candidate for a derivative duty would be to limit one’s procreation (assuming one has the 
means to do so). After all, procreation makes by far the largest contribution to one’s indi-
vidual GHG emissions, and it is also not necessary for a person’s survival. In this respect, 
it is meaningfully different from, say, the need for people in Scandinavia to heat their 
homes or the need to drive into town to purchase groceries.
These observations are bound to make people apprehensive. While many environmen-
talists are quick to advocate driving less and lowering one’s power consumption, the 
thought that people with carbon-intensive lifestyles should limit their procreation is sel-
dom voiced. For many, the idea of criticizing a person’s procreative choices just seems 
too intrusive—an invasion into one of life’s most private and significant choices. In many 
cultures, procreative acts are met with congratulations and celebration, and questioning a 
couple’s procreative choices is viewed as both callous and inappropriate.
Nevertheless, despite cultural norms, it is not reasonable to regard procreation as beyond 
the bounds of moral obligation. When one’s choices affect the welfare of others, they are 
morally significant. Procreation obviously affects the welfare of others—both the child 
who is conceived and the people who are later affected by the child’s presence. Procreative 
choices are special in the sense that they dramatically alter the course of a person’s life 
and are often a significant aspect of a person’s life plans, but these considerations do not 
exempt them from moral evaluation. There may, however, be stronger reasons to exempt 
people from an obligation to limit their procreation even if there is a more general duty 
to reduce one’s GHG emissions, so we must now consider what those reasons might be.
12  Seth Wynes and Kimberly Nicholas, “The Climate Mitigation Gap: Education and Government 
Recommendations Miss the Most Effective Individual Actions,” Environmental Research Letters, July 12, 
2017, iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7541. 
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Do We Have a Right to Unlimited Procreation?
One of the most immediate thoughts that a person might have is that a restriction on 
procreation is a violation of the person’s rights. Rights typically protect basic fundamen-
tal interests that people have, and procreating certainly qualifies: it is something that is 
deeply valued by most people and essential for the continuation of any human society. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the United Nations recognizes a right “to found a family” 
in their Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).13 While it may not be as essential 
to one’s individual well-being as the right to physical security, it certainly seems like an 
important right and deserving of significant moral protection. Does it follow from this 
observation that individuals lack an obligation to limit their own procreation?
Procreative rights might play a role in what policies a government can permissibly en-
force on its citizens with respect to procreation, but a broad right to procreate does not 
morally permit an individual to have as many children as they please. One route to this 
conclusion is by arguing that the right to procreate must be limited in scope. Sarah 
Conly, for instance, appeals to the fact that rights can be restricted when their exercise 
causes harm to others.14 Boosting one’s GHG emissions by having more children may, 
the thought goes, cause great harm to others, and under such circumstances, we do not 
have a right to engage in that behavior. This line of reasoning may strike some readers as 
persuasive, but matters here are actually rather complicated. It is not obvious to everyone 
that a person’s individual contribution to population growth really makes a meaningful 
difference to climate change given its size and scope.15 After all, it is only in the context 
of billions of other people emitting GHGs that this process causes any harm; in isolation, 
a single act of procreation—or even a dozen acts of procreation—does virtually nothing 
to change the global picture with respect to GHG emissions. Consequently, some phi-
losophers would argue that it is inappropriate to claim that an individual’s procreative 
acts cause harm in the morally relevant sense. Carrying Conly’s argument further would 
require either defending an account of harm that is favorable to the argument or explain 
why the mere contribution to an ongoing harm is enough to override the right to procre-
ate. These may be tasks worth pursuing, but they are beyond my means here. Fortunately, 
there is a more straightforward response to an appeal to procreative rights.
13  UN, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN, 1948, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-
human-rights/.
14  Conly, One Child, chapter 3.  
15  Travis Reider, “Review: Sarah Conly, One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More?” Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 26, no. 2 (2016): E-29–E-34.
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Remember that we are currently discussing whether individuals have an obligation to 
limit their procreation. That question is importantly different from whether they have 
a moral right to procreate freely. Even if we have a right to determine the number and 
spacing of our children, that fact alone does not establish that it is morally permissible 
for us to have as many children as we please.16 Most agree that we have a right to freedom 
of speech and expression: people have a fundamental interest in being able to speak and 
express themselves without fear of reprisal by the government. Nevertheless, I can act 
wrongly by saying hurtful or malicious things, and I can be justifiably criticized for these 
actions. Even if I am within my rights to speak my mind, I can do so in ways that violate 
moral duties tied to avoiding unnecessary harm and treating people with respect. To 
provide another example, I may have a right to view sexually explicit material, but it may 
nevertheless be wrong for me to do so under certain circumstances—perhaps because 
of the ways some particular material objectifies women or the fact that viewing some of 
this material could cultivate vices in my character. 
The main point lesson from these cases is this: the right to do X does not entail that one 
ought to do X. In various contexts, we can be morally criticized for behaving in cer-
tain ways even when we are within our moral and legal rights to behave in those ways. 
Therefore, even if we grant that one has a right to procreate freely, it may nevertheless 
be true that one ought to refrain from procreating in certain circumstances. Rights are 
not, after all, a license to ignore all other moral obligations that bear on our conduct. An 
appeal to procreative rights might make sense to object to certain policies imposed by 
the government, but it does not exonerate a person from a moral obligation to limit their 
unnecessary GHG emissions (assuming that such an obligation exists). Under these cir-
cumstances, if we want to justify the claim that there is no duty to limit one’s family size, 
then we must look at a different argument.
What about the Environmental Benefits of Having Children?
Rather than appealing to procreative rights, one could question whether having children 
is really a bad thing for the environment on the whole. Given the figures cited earlier, this 
line of argument might seem puzzling, but the general idea, presented by Julian Simon, 
originates from the view that people are the ultimate source of ideas and innovation. A 
growing population tends to lead to conditions of scarcity, and scarcity creates economic 
incentives to search for solutions to whatever problems scarcity creates. This process, at 
least according to Simon,17 actually leaves us better off than we were before:
16  Overall, Why Have Children? and Rieder, Toward a Small Family Ethic press similar lines of thought.
17  Julian L. Simon, The Ultimate Resource 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1996), 59.
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More people, and increased income, cause resources to become more scarce 
in the short run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise. The higher prices 
present opportunity and prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for 
solutions. Many fail in the search, at a cost to themselves. But in a free society, 
solutions are eventually found. And in the longrun the new developments leave 
us better off than if the problems had not arisen. That is, prices eventually become 
lower than before the increased scarcity occurred.
Assuming Simon’s reasoning is correct, we are left better off in a strictly economic sense: 
the relevant goods and services are less expensive than they were prior to the conditions 
of scarcity that arose.
A variation of Simon’s argument can be deployed with respect to climate change. Solving 
climate change will require a lot of people working together and trying to develop solu-
tions—social, political, and technological—to a vast array of relatively new problems. 
Having more people will increase the severity of the problem—by heightening the scar-
city of the available carbon sinks—in the short term but also create a greater incentive 
to solve the problem and provide more people to generate ideas that might aid the dis-
covery of a solution. In this manner, procreation could contribute to solving the problem 
rather than merely exacerbating it.
There are two core problems with this argument. First, there is no guarantee that the 
people born will have ideas that help us fight climate change. Part of the problem in the 
United States is that there are too many people with ideas that are hindering our ability 
to take serious action in response to climate change. People can have ideas that aid social 
and technological progress, but they can also have ideas that impede these types of prog-
ress or that encourage applications of new technologies that are unethical or otherwise 
objectionable. It is not a straightforward truth that the existence of more ideas is better 
than the existence of fewer ideas: the content of the ideas matters as well.
This point is particularly important with respect to climate change because it tempts 
us with various types of moral corruption.18 Climate change is an extremely difficult 
problem to address with our current institutions, and mitigating it effectively involves 
some short-term costs to us (since we will have to drastically reduce our use of fossil 
fuels). These features make it rather tempting to dismiss the problem as too complex or 
too burdensome to solve and encourage us to instead prioritize economic growth and 
18  Stephen Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), chapter 9.
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short-term gains at the expense of future people’s welfare. A greater number of people 
contemplating climate change is not going to help us if they are just as vulnerable to 
moral corruption and inaction as we have been up to this point.
Second, even if more people will eventually help us progress toward a solution, we can-
not afford to make the problem worse in the short term. The window for adequately 
responding to climate change is rapidly closing, and we no longer have time to wait for 
new generations of people to arrive and aid the search for a solution. In order to meet 
the goals established in the Paris Climate Agreement, have to reduce carbon emissions 
at an extraordinary rate—halving them by 2030, halving them again by 2040, and then 
halving them yet again by 2050—while simultaneously ramping up our carbon capture 
technologies so that we are pulling about 5 gigatons of carbon dioxide from the atmo-
sphere annually by 2050.19 This trajectory is staggering, which means that we do cannot 
afford to continue increasing the severity of the problem. We need to start implement-
ing solutions now. Dithering at this stage just makes the more catastrophic outcomes of 
climate change more likely to materialize.
These considerations notwithstanding, some may still remain unconvinced. Perhaps the 
thought is that the environmentally conscientious are precisely the people who should 
have large families. People who do not care about climate change or related environ-
mental concerns will not be persuaded to limit their procreation, and their children are 
unlikely to be raised to care about climate change or their individual carbon footprints. 
If environmentally conscientious people are the only ones who restrict their procreation, 
then one may worry that those who care about the environment will become a signifi-
cant minority among future generations. This outcome would be worse overall than if 
the environmentally conscientious did not restrict their procreative behaviors.
This version of the objection does not fare better than the prior iteration. For this objec-
tion to be successful, one must assume that there is a very strong connection between 
the environmental views of one’s parents and the resulting environmental views of their 
children. This connection is tenuous at best. Anyone who has taught an environmental 
ethics course in North America has likely encountered students with conservative politi-
cal views who are frustrated by their family’s lack of concern for the environment, and 
many who develop a deep appreciation for the environment do not do so because of 
their parents’ influence. Parents do usually have a significant influence on their children, 
but as children become adults, most of them do not dogmatically endorse all of their 
19  Johan Rockström et al., “A Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization,” Science 355, no. 6331 (2017): 
1269–71.
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parents’ beliefs and values: they will endorse some and reject others. Unless coercion or 
indoctrination are employed, it is far from guaranteed that children will share the same 
values as their parents.
Perhaps the thought is that children are more likely to hold the beliefs and values of their 
parents than alternate worldviews, so the children of the environmentally conscientious 
are more likely to be environmentally conscientious themselves than the children of 
other parents. This more modest view is consistent with many people’s experiences and 
fits with our basic understanding of how children are raised and exposed to various 
worldviews, political ideologies, and so on. Nevertheless, there are some empirical un-
certainties here. Consider, for instance, the studies done by Christopher Ojeda and Peter 
K. Hatemi in which more than 50 percent of children either misperceived or rejected the 
political party affiliation of their parents.20 If their research proves accurate, then there is 
no strong relationship between parents’ political views and the views that their children 
will endorse. Surveying that literature would take us far afield, however, so I will grant 
this more modest claim for the sake of argument.
Even with this concession, the objection still fails to justify having large families because 
there are other ways to increase people’s awareness of climate change and their general 
concern about humanity’s environmental impact beyond just raising children to hold a 
certain set of beliefs and values. These options include (among other things) increasing 
environmental education, developing social and cultural norms focused on living in sus-
tainable ways, and creating economic and other incentives that make it easier for people 
to live an environmentally friendly lifestyle. Prompting people to contemplate their lega-
cies (and engage in the long-term thinking that this requires) has also proven effective in 
increasing people’s engagement with environmental issues like climate change.21 There 
are many ways we can motivate people to care about environmental issues without re-
quiring environmentally conscientious people to have large families.
What about Carbon Offsets?
At this point, one might offer a different strategy for reducing an individual’s contribu-
tion to climate change. Instead of trying to have a smaller carbon footprint by refraining 
from procreation, one could instead try to offset the emissions generated by their pro-
20  Christopher Ojeda and Peter K. Hatemi, “Accounting for the Child in the Transmission of Political 
Party Identification,” American Sociological Review 80, no. 6 (2015): 1150–74.
21  See Lisa Zaval, Ezra M. Markowitz, and Eike U. Weber, “How Will I Be Remembered? Conserving the 
Environment for the Sake of One’s Legacy,” Psychological Science 26, no. 2 (2015): 231–36. 
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creation. Offsetting individual GHG emissions means that “for every unit of greenhouse 
gas you cause to be added to the atmosphere, you also cause a unit to be subtracted from 
it.”22 An individual can accomplish this by donating money to a company or organization 
that will use that money to fund a project that will prevent GHG emissions somewhere 
else in the world.23 In this manner, your net effect—in terms of GHG emissions—can be 
zero: the atmosphere can contain the same amount of GHGs as a result of your actions 
as it would contain if you never existed.
Explicit assessments of the ethics of carbon offsetting are relatively rare compared oth-
er topics in the climate change literature, but the practice has been endorsed by John 
Broome and Kai Spiekermann.24 There are, however, significant objections to offsetting.25 
One of these concerns is about how we can determine whether a particular act of offset-
ting actually influences the outcome. If, for instance, we are donating money to build a 
wind turbine but that turbine would be built regardless of how much we donated, then 
our attempt at offsetting our emissions failed: the emissions reductions attributed to this 
source of wind power would have occurred without our donation. This is known as the 
problem of additionality, and in practice it is often difficult to know with certainty that 
your attempt to offset your emissions actually makes a difference.
An additional practical problem is that many offsetting projects involve the creation or 
protection of short-term carbon sinks.26 The most common examples involve the plant-
ing of trees or the protection of existing trees. Offsetting through these methods is un-
22  See John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (New York: Norton), 85.
23  Such projects might include the creation of a hydroelectric power plant, working to prevent 
deforestation in the Amazon, or helping install efficient cooking stoves in developing countries (so that 
the residents do not have to cook with firewood).
24  See Broome, Climate Matters, chapter 5. Kai Spiekermann’s endorsement of carbon offsetting is 
highly qualified because he bypasses a number of practical concerns about their implementation and 
also questions the motivations of those who purchase them. Specifically, he morally criticizes those who 
would purchase carbon offsets only when they are cheap. See Spiekermann, “Buying Low, Flying High: 
Carbon Offsets and Partial Compliance,” Political Studies 62, no. 4 (2014): 913–29.
25  See Simon Bullock, Mike Childs, and Tom Picken, A Dangerous Distraction: Why Offsetting Is Failing 
the Climate and People: The Evidence (London: Friends of the Earth, 2009), https://www.foei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/dangerous_distraction.pdf ; Simon Caney and Cameron Hepburn, “Carbon 
Trading: Unethical, Unjust and Ineffective?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 69 (2011): 201–34; 
and Keith Hyams and Tina Fawcett, “The Ethics of Carbon Offsetting,” WIREs Climate Change 4, no. 2 
(2013): 91–98.
26  See Rieder, Toward a Small Family Ethic, 21.
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reliable because trees die, rot, and eventually decompose. As a result, the CO2 that these 
trees absorbed through photosynthesis is eventually released back into the atmosphere. 
The only way that these means of offsetting can be effective is if measures are taken to 
ensure that these short-term carbon sinks are maintained indefinitely—something that 
cannot be guaranteed.
These are perhaps the two biggest problems with reducing one’s individual carbon foot-
print via offsetting, but a few other objections are also worth acknowledging. First, cal-
culating both one’s total GHG emissions and the emissions that are genuinely offset by a 
particular project is difficult to accomplish. Estimates on these figures can vary dramati-
cally depending on which particular carbon calculator a person uses, and that makes it 
difficult for anyone to be confident that their offsets actually result in their carbon foot-
print being sufficiently reduced.
Second, offsets are an appealing option in large part because they are relatively cheap, but 
if a large portion of people started purchasing them, the price would quickly increase. 
Thus, as a large-scale solution for helping people meet their moral duties to reduce their 
GHG emissions, offsetting would not be a viable strategy. For most people, its financial 
viability is highly contingent.
Third, promoting offsets may undercut proper moral motivation: people may purchase 
offsets as a way of clearing their conscience but without making any broader lifestyle 
changes that would make a bigger difference.27 As a result, there is a worry that promot-
ing cheap carbon offsets “creates the mistaken impression that offsetting is all we need 
to solve the problem of GHG emissions” and “sends the misleading signal that the aver-
age Western lifestyle does not need to be reformed to mitigate climate change because 
buying a few cheap offsets is enough.”28 A better strategy, one reasons, would be to lower 
our carbon footprints by just emitting less. That strategy sends the right message about 
pursuing a solution to climate change.
Even with all this in mind, I should stress that purchasing carbon offsets is still better 
than doing nothing. In cases where emissions reductions would be prohibitively difficult 
or impossible, purchasing carbon offsets is a worthwhile strategy for reducing one’s car-
bon footprint. Nevertheless, in general, purchasing carbon offsets is not a reliable means 
27  This sentiment is reinforced by the fact that offsetting is often used in conjunction with marketing 
campaigns that aim to get people to continue engaging in carbon-intensive activities such as driving 
SUVs or booking long flights.
28  Spiekermann, “Buying Low, Flying High,” 926.
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of lowering one’s GHG emissions. The best approach is not to emit and then offset but to 
prevent the emissions in the first place. In the case of procreation, the overwhelming ma-
jority of people in the developed world can control how many children they have. Thus, 
the preferred moral strategy for reducing the carbon footprint tied to their procreation 
is for them to limit their family size.
Would a Duty to Limit Family Size Be Too Demanding?
We now reach perhaps the strongest objection and the one that is likely to resonate with 
parents or aspiring parents the most: a duty to limit procreation may be seen as unrea-
sonably demanding. Many believe that morality has limits and that a person cannot be 
required to abandon their most important projects and pursuits to comply with moral 
obligations.29 This objection is most powerful when the purported obligation would de-
mand that we sacrifice something that is central to our lives and perhaps a core compo-
nent of our identity. Procreation fits this description for a lot of people: conceiving and 
raising a child is a life project that becomes central to their identity.
The strength of the demandingness objection will depend in part on how stringent the 
obligation to restrict one’s procreation is. If we must all go childless, then the obligation 
may well be too demanding. For many people, gestating and raising a child is a central 
life project that they would not be willing to abandon. Only antinatalists such as David 
Benatar and Jimmy Licon advocate such an uncompromising standard.30 This obliga-
tion is less demanding if couples are allowed to have one child and less demanding still 
if parents are allowed to have two biological children, which would mean adhering to 
replacement fertility levels (or lower).
While conceiving and raising a child constitutes a powerful transformational experience, 
the value of this experience surely diminishes with each child that one conceives. The 
difference between being a parent and not being a parent is enormous—a change not 
only in one’s life circumstances but also in one’s identity. Perhaps the difference between 
being a parent of siblings and the parent of an only child is also significant in this respect. 
But surely at some point, this is no longer true. It would be dubious for someone to say 
29  One classic representation of this view comes from Bernard Williams, “Integrity,” in Utilitarianism: 
For and Against, ed. J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1973), 108–18.
30  They also advocate these positions on the basis of reasons that are largely independent of climate 
change. See David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006); and Jimmy Licon, 
“The Immortality of Procreation,” Think 11, no. 32 (2012): 85–91.
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that having ten children instead of nine radically alters their personal identity or that 
their life will be fundamentally incomplete if they can only have nine children. 
Of course, the demandingness of restricting one’s procreative behavior is not just limited 
to the ways in which it impacts one’s identity. Many view children as a significant source 
of personal happiness and believe that restricting their family size will deprive their lives 
of much joy. For those who want children, an obligation to limit their family size risks 
depriving them of a central source of long-term happiness.
Or at least conventional wisdom holds that having children often makes people happier. 
The social scientific research on the subject paints a very different picture. The general 
trend appears to be that having children decreases happiness.31 Having children, on aver-
age, appears to have an adverse effect on one’s marital satisfaction, life satisfaction, and 
general reported happiness.32 While there will surely be memorable positive experiences 
from a child’s life, these tend to be outweighed by the day-to-day sacrifices parents must 
make to ensure that their children have a worthwhile upbringing. 
Now one may be skeptical about this research. One complication is that the major ben-
efits of child-rearing occur later in life. Once children become adults, they no longer 
31  See Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert MacCulloch, “Inequality and Happiness: Are 
Europeans and Americans Different?” Journal of Public Economics 88, no. 9–10 (2004): 2009–42; Rafael 
Di Tella, Robert MacCulloch, and Andrew Oswald, “The Macroeconomics of Happiness,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 85, no. 4 (2003: 809–27); Jean Twenge, W. Keith Campbell, and Craig Foster, 
“Parenthood and Marital Satisfaction: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Journal of Marriage and Family 
65, no. 3 (2003): 574–83; Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 
242–44; Nattavudh Powdthavee, “Putting a Price Tag on Friends, Relatives, and Neighbours: Using 
Surveys of Life Satisfaction to Value Social Relationships,” Journal of Socio-Economics 37, no. 4 (2008): 
1459–80; Thomas Hansen, “Parenthood and Happiness: A Review of Folk Theories versus Empirical 
Evidence,” Social Indicators Research 108, no. 1 (2012): 29–64; and Rachel Margolis and Mikko 
Myrskylä, “Parental Well-Being Surrounding First Birth as a Determinant of Further Parity Progression,” 
Demography 52, no. 4 (2015): 1147–66. Angus Deaton and Arthur Stone observed the same effects 
but thought that they were negligible if one controlled for parental choice. Thus, they conclude that 
parents and nonparents will have on average the same levels of happiness provided that parents choose 
to be parents and nonparents choose not to be parents. See Deaton and Stone, “Evaluative and Hedonic 
Wellbeing among Those with and without Children at Home,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 111, no. 4 (2014): 1328–33.
32  There is some variability depending on where one lives. In most industrialized countries, having 
children seems to have a pronounced negative effect on parents’ well-being, but in others (e.g., Portugal, 
Hungary), the effect appears to be positive. See Jennifer Glass, Robin Simon, and Matthew Andersson, 
“Parenthood and Happiness: Effects of Work-Family Reconciliation Policies in 22 OECD Countries,” 
American Journal of Sociology 122, no. 3 (2016): 886–929.
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require a great amount of personal care, and they can be a source of many joys—pride in 
their achievements, pleasant interactions with them at family gatherings, and so on. Ad-
ditionally, having a child often increases the perceived meaningfulness of one’s life even 
if it diminishes one’s well-being. How are these considerations to be weighed against the 
costs associated with gestating and raising a child to adulthood?33
One immediate observation is that the long-term benefits sometimes fail to materialize. 
If either the parent or their child dies younger than expected, then the parent will not 
be able to reap the long-term benefits associated with parenting. That may also occur if 
the relationship between parent and child becomes strained over time. Admittedly, such 
occurrences are not the norm, and so most people will probably anticipate enjoying a re-
lationship with their children when they are late in life. I am not sure there is any straight-
forward way to aggregate the long-term benefits with the short-term costs. How do the 
pleasant experiences of interacting with your children later in life compare to the sleepless 
nights, stressfully busy days, and substantial financial costs (i.e., usually the equivalent 
more than one hundred thousand dollars in the developed world) tied to child-rearing?
Here is a conservative conclusion that I believe can be reached from the research conduct-
ed and these other considerations: having children on the grounds that it will make you 
happier overall is, at best, a gamble. There is compelling evidence that it usually makes 
people’s lives less enjoyable in the short term. It might make your life go better when you 
are older, and this combination of enjoyment and sense of meaningfulness might out-
weigh the unhappiness experienced earlier in life. But there is no guarantee that either of 
these outcomes will materialize. The safer route to promoting your happiness would be 
to stay childless.
Even if this view is accepted, there may still be some people who would prefer to take the 
gamble. Some simply cannot envision a fulfilling life without a child in the picture, and 
others will be confident that their parenting experience will go well. The good news for 
these people is that I am not advocating that everyone go childless. I have been advocating 
a duty to limit one’s family size, and that is not the same as limiting one’s number of chil-
dren to zero. For those parents who are deeply invested in having biological children, I be-
lieve that having two children per couple (or one per person) is an acceptable compromise 
33  This observation is the foundation for part of Bryan Caplan’s argument that people should, on self-
interested grounds, have more children. He thinks the value of children later in life is not sufficiently 
captured by the relevant sociological and psychological research. See Caplan, Selfish Reasons to Have 
More Kids: Why Being a Great Parent Is Less Work and More Fun than You Think (New York: Basic 
Books, 2011). See also Roy Baumeister et al., “Some Key Differences between a Happy Life and a 
Meaningful One,” Journal of Positive Psychology 8, no. 6 (2013): 505–16.
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given the moral considerations in play. This standard does not force aspiring parents with 
a deep desire for biological children to forgo that experience, and one child per person, 
if universalized, is slightly below replacement-level fertility. Thus, parents with two bio-
logical children can be said to have done their part not to contribute to overpopulation. 
A two-child family is also sufficient for the creation of sibling relationships, which some 
parents consider important.
Now at this juncture, two concerns might be raised to my proposal. First, if the par-
ents are reflective, they will recognize that many people who should have two or fewer 
children will have more anyway. Does it follow that the environmentally conscientious 
parents should have no children as a means of correcting for others’ noncompliance? If 
their desire for biological children runs deep enough, then I believe the parents are un-
der no obligation to further restrict their procreation even when noncompliance with 
the two-child standard is foreseeable. It would be good for these parents to restrict 
their procreation further, but doing so goes beyond what morality requires. Individu-
als are required to do their part to help solve our ongoing climate problem, but they 
are not required to be martyrs for the environment, especially since the solutions to 
these problems require large-scale collective action at the institutional level. It is sim-
ply not reasonable to ask individuals to bear enormous burdens with respect to these 
problems when their individual actions will make only a small difference toward solv-
ing the problem. They should still do their fair share, but requiring them to do more 
due to the noncompliance seems to punish them for their efforts to adhere to their 
moral duty. Such a proposal is not just profoundly unfair but also self-defeating, since 
it could serve to undercut people’s motivations to do their moral duty in the first place.
A second concern about my proposal is that a universal two-child standard is not re-
ally a neutral policy. Because there are such a large number of young people relative to 
the population as a whole, even if all procreating couples were to limit themselves to 
only two biological children, the population would still increase significantly over the 
next several decades. Thus, it would appear that I should advocate a standard that is 
more stringent than two children per couple.
This objection conflates concerns about policy objectives with concerns about indi-
vidual moral obligations. At the level of policy, we should definitely aim for a fertility 
rate of below two if we are to stabilize population quickly enough to aid our response 
to climate change. But what we aim for at the level of public policy does not always 
align perfectly with what individuals are morally obligated to do. At the policy level, 
we want to create conditions where parents will freely choose to have (on average) 
less than one child per person—conditions that have already been achieved in many 
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developed countries. Nevertheless, for some people, requiring them to have only a 
single child or to go childless is, in my view, too onerous a burden to place on them. It 
is enough that they are reproducing below the replacement level fertility rate. We may 
strive to create conditions that would incentivize them to choose only one child (or 
perhaps none), but in my view, they are not strictly obligated to have fewer than two 
children. There are, however, other people who are indeed obligated to have less than 
two children, and these groups of people may provide an avenue whereby the target 
fertility rate of less than two per woman falls more in line with what individual moral 
obligation requires.
Many people are not so deeply invested in having biological children so as to justify 
having two children. For them, adopting children would often be a better choice. Adop-
tion is frequently an available but unexplored option for those who want to increase 
their family size. Many children who already exist are in dire need of permanent homes, 
and other things equal, meeting the needs of children who already exist would seem a 
more important moral objective than the creation of new people. On these grounds, 
Daniel Friedrich has argued that we generally have a moral duty to adopt rather than 
procreate.34 This argument is only bolstered by the climate-related impacts associated 
with procreation, since these provide an additional reason for favoring adoption if it is 
available. If the relevant desire is simply the experience of raising children, then prospec-
tive parents are obligated to look into adoption and see if it is a viable option for them. Of 
course, we may well acknowledge exceptions for women with a strong desire to experi-
ence pregnancy,35 and adopting children may in some cases prove very burdensome for 
the family in question. Under these conditions, having biological children is permissible.
Another group of people who should not have two children are those who are perfectly 
content with one child. When there is no deep desire for a second biological child, then 
the parents should not procreate further. The same reasoning applies to those who do 
not have any preference for children: these people should not procreate at all. This point 
might sound obvious, but we must remember that many people procreate for relatively 
frivolous reasons (given the gravity of the choice). Some procreate simply because they 
view it as a normal thing to do at their age or because they witness their friends having 
children. If parents’ reasons for having children are not rooted in some deep desire for 
biological children, then they should not procreate.
34  Daniel Friedrich, “A Duty to Adopt?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2013): 25–39.
35  See Tina Rulli, “Preferring a Genetically-Related Child,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 13, no. 6 (2016): 
669–98.
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Of course, the social pressures to have children can be stronger or weaker depending on 
the context, and the social norms we observe in childhood can influence how we form 
our preferences. Most cultures are dominantly pronatalist, and so people often subcon-
sciously form expectations that they will have children when they are older. Nonethe-
less, social pressures and expectations to engage in certain behaviors rarely justify do-
ing something wrong. Most cultures in the developed world promote carbon-intensive 
lifestyles and meat eating, but there are ethical arguments that both these practices are 
wrong. If those arguments are correct, then doing the right thing will sometimes be in-
convenient or socially awkward. The same may well be true for limiting one’s family size, 
but moral obligations typically take precedence over moral and social norms. There may, 
of course, be rare circumstances where the costs of certain norm-defying behavior would 
be so devastating for a person that they cannot be reasonably expected to defy expecta-
tions. If a person were in danger of being disowned by their parents and other family 
members if they do not procreate, then their particular act of procreation might be justi-
fied. But among the audience of this paper—namely, those in the developed world with 
large carbon footprints—how many people are really in such radical circumstances? For 
the overwhelming majority of such people, the costs of having fewer children than others 
expect will be much less severe.
Overall, concerns about the demandingness of limiting one’s family size are not sufficient 
to undermine the obligation to do so. At best, this objection provides some constraints on 
the scope of the obligation. Prospective parents with strong desires for biological children 
should not be forced to give up the experiences of gestation and child-rearing. But even 
for parents who fit this description, an obligation to restrict procreation to below the rate 
of replacement (i.e., two children per woman or lower) is not overly demanding. Two 
children would provide them the means to enjoy both the experiences of biological par-
enthood and provide sibling relationships for their children. Adoption is a suitable avenue 
for people to expand their families further.
Conclusion
We have seen that procreation has a disproportionately large carbon footprint compared 
to other GHG-emitting activities, so prima facie, if people have an obligation to limit 
their individual carbon footprints, then there is an obligation to limit their family size. I 
surveyed four reasons that could be offered to defend procreation as a special exception to 
this more general moral obligation, but I argued that none of these reasons is persuasive. 
A duty to limit one’s family size is not undercut by appealing to procreative rights, the 
environmental benefits of procreation, the practice of offsetting one’s emissions, or con-
cerns about the demanding nature of the obligation. We did see, however, that concerns 
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about demandingness do affect the stringency of the obligation in some circumstances. 
Nonetheless, until further arguments are presented, we should accept the conclusion that 
if there is a duty to reduce one’s individual carbon footprint, then there exists a duty to 
limit one’s family size when possible. This duty will primarily apply to those in the devel-
oped world, given the large per capita GHG emissions of people living in these nations.36 
How can this duty be fulfilled? First, individuals should consider whether they want 
children. If a couple decide that they have no strong desire for children, then they 
should not procreate at all. Given the carbon footprint associated with procreation, if 
there is a general duty to limit one’s carbon footprint, then people should not procreate 
unless they have a strong reason to do so.
Suppose a couple does want children, but what they mainly value is the experience of 
raising children. If the child’s genetics and the experience of pregnancy are not signifi-
cant concerns for the prospective parents, then they should attempt to adopt a child. 
Should this prove impossible or unduly burdensome, then they may permissibly pro-
create.
Once a couple has engaged in procreation, they can then consider whether they want 
another child. For some people, one child will be enough to fulfill their deep desires to 
be parents. These individuals should not have additional children. But if the parents 
view a second biological child as essential to their life plans, then they may permissibly 
have a second child. The second child represents the upper limit of the obligation how-
ever: having any more children will violate it. Once a couple goes beyond the replace-
ment fertility rate, it is clear that they are actively contributing to population growth 
and the associated growth of our collective carbon footprint. No reasonable construal 
of a duty to limit one’s carbon footprint can permit this behavior. 
It may strike some as disconcerting that our procreative choices could be restricted 
by climate change, but procreation’s contribution to our carbon footprints reveals an 
important way in which procreative choices are not private. They are personal and pro-
foundly meaningful, but they also contribute to environmental impacts that will affect 
the welfare of future people. Thus, those of us with carbon-intensive lifestyles should 
carefully consider how many children we ought to have.
36  Of course, population growth can contribute to a variety of other environmental problems (and 
some nonenvironmental ones), and these considerations might entail a duty for even those groups with 
miniscule per capita carbon footprints to limit their procreation to replacement-level fertility rates. 
These considerations, however, would have to be the topic of another paper entirely and take us beyond 
the bounds of what a duty to reduce one’s GHG emissions would require.
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